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Number: 3365
Continent: Africa
Region: East
Place Names: Mozambique
Year of Origin: 1918
Title: Map of Northern Mozambique
Sub-Title: [upper right margin] P.M.C.
Language: German
Publish Origin: Pretoria
Height: 91.7
Width: 70.0
Units: centimeters
Size Class.: Medium
Scale: 1 : 1,000,000
Color Type: Outline Color
Images of this map are not yet available.
Cartographer: NORFORCE, South Africa Topographical Section
Engraver:
Publisher: Pretoria: Government Printing Works
Other Contributors: Edward Northey
Northernmost Latitude: -10.7
Southernmost Latitude: -19.0
Westernmost Longitude: 34.3
Easternmost Longitude: 41.0
Measurement Notes: on map
Notes: [SOURCE Dasa Pahor] Photo-lithograph in 3 colours, contemporary manuscript additions in red pen and pencil, mounted upon original linen with old folds, former owner?s inscription in pen to verso linen (Very Good, overall clean and bright, some minor toning along old folds, some very light stains, some wear at folds along margins), 98 x 74 cm (38.5 x 29 inches). This is one of the most important single maps of World War I?s East Africa Campaign. It has the distinction of being the very first scientifically accurate and detailed general map of Northern Mozambique, in addition to being the authoritative map used by British forces during their relentless, yet unsuccessful, pursuit of General Emile von Lettow-Vorbeck?s Schutztruppe through thousands of kilometres of jungles, swamps and savannas, from March to August 1918. The Northern Mozambique theatre featured some of the most dramatic action of the East Africa Campaign, which is regarded as one of the greatest frontier guerilla contests of all time, and the most suspiring, yet little known, major aspect of World War I. In essence, during this almost four-year long campaign, an increasingly large British force chased a small German-African army across modern Tanzania, Northern Mozambique and into Zambia. Lettow-Vorbeck was one of the history?s most ingenious and successful guerilla commanders, and all the while he evaded capture, while mounting devastating stealth attacks upon his enemy?s overextended supply lines. In the end, Lettow-Vorbeck was fighting in Northern Rhodesia, undefeated, when World War I ended, forcing his surrender. The present work is a separately-issued, large topographical map that specifically addresses the priorities of the cartography of military movement. Done to a scale of 1:1 000,000, the map embraces all of Northern Mozambique, Southern Nyasaland (Malawi) and adjacent areas of German East Africa (Tanzania). All significant rivers and lakes are carefully delineated, while all major points of elevation, being mountain ranges, hills and plateaus, are expressed thought hachures. The map also labels international and district boundaries, while naming internal divisions within Mozambique, such as the territory of the ?Nyassa Company?, in the north, where most of the action occurred. Importantly, the map labels every major transport route, including ?Railways?, ?Motor Roads?, ?Main Roads?, ?Smaller Roads and Paths?; as well as the locations of ?Missions?, ?Bomas? (ranches), and ?Villages?. Critically, the map also highlights points of military interest, such as frontier forts and communications infrastructure, such as ?wireless stations?. The accuracy and detail of the work is totally unprecedented on a general map of the region. Notably, the map features some manuscript additions, in both red pen and pencil, which seemingly trace itineraries along roads and rivers. These were almost certainly added by British military officers during the war, as the lines correspond to known British travel corridors. The map was made by, and for the use, of the Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia Frontier Force, better known as NORFORCE (its telegraphic code), a special infantry unit based in Nyasaland (Malawi), that was amongst the most effective and daring British detachments of the campaign. From 1916, NORFORCE was lead by General Edward Northey (1868 - 1953), a seasoned veteran of the Second Anglo-Boer War, who more recently was wounded while fighting on the front lines at Ypres (1915). NORFORCE maintained a strength of 4,000 men of a rich demographic mixture and background, with troops from Britain, South Africa, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This range of experience allowed them to acclimatize to the frontier environment much better than many of the other British units. The present map bears the line ?Compiled and drawn by SA Topographical Section, NORFORCE ? Zomba, 24th February, 1918?, revealing that a cadre of South African military engineers who were assigned to NORFORCE drafted the original manuscript at the unit?s forward base in Zomba (Nyasaland / Malawi), a location which appears on the map, a short distance form the Mozambique border. Prior to this time, there was no scientifically accurate, integrated, detailed map of Northern Mozambique. Since the war had moved into the region, in November 1917, the British forces were in desperate need of a general map, which accurately depicted all aspects of the country critical to military movement. The rainy season in the region, which lasts from December to March, brought a lull in fighting, before an expected British offensive against Lettow-Vorbeck. During this time, NORFORCE?s SA Engineers carefully devised the present map from the best sources, as stated, ?Compiled from the Portuguese Nyasa Company?s, the WNLA [Western Nyasaland], District, Mozambique and the Zambesia Company's District Quelimane Maps, with corrections from travellers' routes and reconnaissance.? These sources include area maps and sketches made for the private Niassa, Zambezi and Mozambique companies that respectively governed chunks of Northern Mozambique, under license from Lisbon. Fortunately, the British had access to the companies? map archives (most of which were based in London), as well as maps and sketches provided by the Portuguese. Moreover, NORFORCE and other British units had recently conducted some of their own reconnaissance of the region, bringing back useful geographic intelligence. While these disparate sources contained valuable information, they tended to have been made for incidental purposes, requiring them to be checked against other sources and carefully integrated with other maps. The engineers in Zomba clearly did an excellent job editing and integrating the disparate antecedents, as the present map fairs favorably when compare to a modern satellite map of the region. The manuscript from Zomba would then have been rushed by rail to Pretoria, South Africa, where it was photolithographed at the Government Printing Works. Copies would then have been mounted on linen, and rushed back to the conflict theatre in time for the British offensive in mid-March 1918. That the map was ready to be used in the field in March is confirmed by the note affixed to the example in the National Archives UK that reads, ?This map detached from GHQ operation reports March 1918?. Important, the map would have been produced in small quantities, exclusively for the use of senior British officers, and would have been classified as ?top secret?, as it was critical that an example never fall into German hands, as the map was far better than any available to Lettow-Vorbeck. The present map was used as the blueprint on which the British offensive against Lettow-Vorbeck was planned. While NORFORCE gave the Germans as good chase, after six further months of fierce frontier warfare, fought all across Northern Mozambique, Lettow-Vorbeck managed to slip out of the country, attacking Northern Rhodesia. NORFORCE, and the British army in general, were ultimately unsuccessful in capturing or defeating Lettow-Vorbeck, and that fact was the focus of much contemporary and subsequent criticism. While the British effort, in general, inarguably lacked vigour and guile, the role of NORFORCE has recently been reassessed by historians, who see their efforts in a more positive light. Nevertheless, Lettow-Vorbeck was a legendary, timeless commander, like Nelson or Wellington, and any force would have been hard pressed to take him out. A Note on Provenance Interestingly the present example of the map features the former owner?s inscription of ?Serr? de Azevedo / Mitange, Junho de 1921?. This clearly refers to Dr. Jos?de Oliveira Serr? de Azevedo, who served as the Chief of the Health Service of Mozambique from 1893 to 1921. Serr? de Azevedo battled giant bureaucratic inertia to improve the public health of the country and was a major figure in tropical medicine of the era, with his works still quoted in papers to this day. The map was evidently acquired in June 1921, while the doctor was traveling through the small village of Mitange, located to the south of Quelimane. As the map remained by far and away the best map of the region, it would have been useful for post-war travel across Northern Mozambique. A Note on Rarity The present map was published exclusively for the strategic reference of the British High Command in East Africa, and the field use of NORFORCE and other British military forces. The map would have been classified as ?top secret? and only a small number of examples would have been published. Moreover, of the few copies printed, many would likely have perished due to heavily use in the field. Given this, it is not surprising that the map is today extremely rare. We can trace only 2 institutional examples (British Library; National Archives U.K.), and can find no sales records going back 30 years. Setting the Scene: WWI in East Africa The present map of Northern Mozambique focuses on an exciting aspect of WWI?s East Africa Campaign, which was perhaps the most extraordinary, yet popularly forgotten, aspect of the war. In essence, a German-African force, that never numbered more that 14,000 troops, held down a British-Allied army that, at its height, numbered 300,000 men. The reason that the conflict has since escaped popular memory is likely that it was the only theatre of the war where Germany had gotten the better of the Britain. As a result, British historians were loathe to discuss this ?embarrassment?, while Germans very much wanted to forget WWI altogether. On the eve of the war, Germany possessed Deutsch-Ostafrika, a colony it had established in 1885, which comprised all of modern mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika), Rwanda and Burundi. This vast land of 7.5 million indigenous inhabitants was ruled by barely 5,000 Germans. Immediately to the north, was British East Africa (modern Kenya), with featured the great port of Mombasa and its new, bustling capital, Nairobi. The colony was anchored by the Uganda Railway, which connected Mombasa and Nairobi with Kampala, and which was considered to be one of the great strategic assets of the British Empire. When World War I broke out in Europe, many on both sides actually hoped that the respective parties in East Africa could remain neutral, while the conflict was fought elsewhere. However, this proved to be incredibly na?e. The fact was, neither side was well prepared for mass conflict. The Germans could only count on the Schutztruppe (Protection Force) of 260 Europeans and 2,470 Askari solders, in addition to 2,700 irregulars (German settlers). It was made clear from the outset that there would never be any chance of reinforcements from Germany. Moreover, the German arsenals were full of outdated guns that were low on ammunition. On the other side, the anchor of the British army in East Africa, the King?s African Rifles (KAR), could count about the same strength as the Schutztruppe. However, the British knew that they could, in time, count upon thousands of Indian auxiliary troops, as well as reinforcements from South Africa. Moreover, they were much better armed than the German side. Beyond that, they could count on the assistance of their Belgian allies (from the Congo) and, from 1916, their Portuguese allies (from Mozambique), although their capabilities were questionable. One factor that everyone, including the German political command, underestimated was Lieutenant Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870 - 1964), the commander of the Schutztruppe. He would prove himself to be one of the greatest guerrilla fighters in world history. He trained his small Askari force into a highly motivated, skilled unit, specialized in lightening, stealth operations of asymmetric warfare. Lettow-Vorbeck knew from the outset that upon the arrival of the British reinforcements, he would be hopelessly outmanned and outgunned, such that he would have a zero-percent chance of winning a conventional war, or firmly holding on to German territory. Thus, his goal was to wage a guerrilla war, drawing vast quantities of British resources into East Africa, and then pinning them down, so that they could not be redirected to fight Germany in Europe. He managed to carry out his design, and, as the late military historian Edwin Palmer Hoyt remarked, Lettow-Vorbeck mounted the ?the greatest single guerrilla operation in history, and the most successful.? Upon the start of hostilities in East Africa, Lettow-Vorbeck drew first blood. He ordered some of his detachments to make forays across the border into British East Africa. However, the British mounted a powerful reprise, in the form of a two-pronged operation to invade German East Africa. At the beginning of November 1914, the so-called British ?Force B?, consisting of 8,000 Indian Expeditionary troops, mounted a naval invasion of the German port city of Tanga. Meanwhile, a force of the KAR, the so-called ?Force C?, invaded German East Africa to the west of Mount Kilimanjaro, aiming to strike the German HQ at Neu Moshi. To the absolute shock and horror of the British HQ in Nairobi, both the Tanga and Kilimanjaro expeditions failed spectacularly. Even though the British forces outnumbered the Germans 8:1 at Tanga and 4:1 in the interior, they severely underestimated the abilities of the opposition. The spectacle was described as one of ?the most notable failures in British military history.? The British spent 1915, licking their wounds, while Lettow-Vorbeck went on the offensive. He orchestrated as series of during raids deep into British territory in Kenya and Uganda. This seemed to have the effect of paralyzing the British, compelling them to stay within their fortified bases, while they lost control over their own countryside. By late 1915, the Schutztruppe was making regular raids upon the treasured Uganda Railway, which had the effect of cutting off all communication between Nairobi and Uganda. This, more than anything, angered Whitehall, and extreme measures were henceforth taken in an effort to take Lettow-Vorbeck out, once and for all! General Jan Smuts (1870 - 1950), himself a former Afrikaner guerilla fighter, was appointed the new commander of the British East Africa HQ. He was given an army of 73,000 met with a mandate to hunt down and destroy the Schutztruppe. As shown on the present map, in March 1916, Smuts invaded German East Africa. This time, Britain?s overwhelming force quickly succeeded in taking much of the country. However, what the British did not yet realize is that this was all proceeding to Lettow-Vorbeck?s plan. The wily German commander progressively withdrew his forces further and further south into German territory, all the while conducting small, lightening raids upon British positions. While these raids were small, they had the effect of terrifying the opposition, while stealing much needed stores and ammunition. As the British were drawn further and further south, they required ever more men to guard their supply lines. By May 1916, NORFORCE, led by Brigadier General Northey, became a major, and perhaps the most effective, component of the British effort in what is today Southern Tanzania. Their force, 4,000 strong, charged into the region from their forward bases in Nyasaland (Malawi), harrying (but not defeating) the German forces. In January 1917, the British effort in East Africa suffered a self-inflicted blow, when the competent Smuts left the scene to serve in the Imperial War Cabinet in London. He was replaced with less vigorous leadership. While the British and Belgians, heavily relying on NORORCE, actually continued to gain territory at the Germans? expense, once again, they were being drawn deeper and deeper into Lettow-Vorbeck?s trap. Lettow-Vorbeck?s next target was to take his army into Portuguese Mozambique. There the land was lush and Portuguese forces were thought to be fart less competent than their British allies. There, the Schutztruppe commander hoped to be able to re-supply his army, while forcing the British to enter Mozambique, thus stretching their supply lines, hopefully, beyond the breaking point. Moreover, this would be perfectly legal, as Portugal and Germany had formally declared war upon each other in March 1916. The British high command anticipated that Mozambique would be the Schutztruppe?s desired destination, and the main objective of the British was to stop Lettow-Vorbeck from crossing the Romuva River (the British East Africa-Mozambique boundary). In the summer of 1917, the Germans split their force into two parts, one under Lettow-Vorbeck and the other under Major Theodor Tafel, in an effort to make the game of cat-and-mouse more challenging for the British. However, the British plans to stop the Germans from entering Mozambique were crushed when Lettow-Vorbeck?s force of 1,500 men defeated a British force of 4,900 at the Battle of Mahiwa (October 15-8, 1917). That being said, the battle had completely depleted Lettow-Vorbeck?s munitions and food rations, such that the move to Mozambique became an urgent necessity, as opposed to an elective option. If the Germans could not capture a large cache of weapons and supplies within the next month or so, they would have to surrender. NORFORCE and WWI in Mozambique The war in Mozambique only lasted 9 months (November 1917 to August 1918); however, it included some of the fiercest guerilla-style fighting ever seen in Africa, and was arguably Lettow-Vorbeck?s most impressive turn of the entire conflict. In essence, Lettow-Vorbeck?s army moved constantly, preying upon the ill-prepared Portuguese outposts, while the British unsuccessfully pursued them. In the words of a German soldier, the Schutztruppe?s time in Mozambique can be reduced to, ?We chase the Portuguese, and the English chase us?. This was truly amazing, as Lettow-Vorbeck had barely 2,000 men at his disposal, while he was opposed by an Anglo-British force that in theory could muster 100,000 men! As background the action in Mozambique, it is worth noting that Portugal, while the titular ruler of country, only possessed a tenuous grip over Northern Mozambique. Most of the fighting occurred in the far northern part of the country (modern Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces) that was territory of the Niassa Company, a private concern, chartered in 1891, that was permitted to govern the region in the name of the Portuguese government, as Lisbon lacked the funds and manpower to fulfill the role herself. Curiously, the Niassa Company was actually run out of London, dominated by British investors. It was described as a ?private colony inside a Portuguese colony?, and its acticvities suggested that it existed not to ?colonise but to extract the maximum profit? from the land. Its ?corrupt and cruel? officers denuded the region of natural resources, while mistreating its inhabitants. As a result, the Niassa Company and the Portuguese regime, were immensely unpopular in the region. This caused the Anglo-Portuguese forces in Northern Mozambique to be isolated, while the ?invading? Germans were often well received by the locals, who frequently rendered them material assistance. It is worth noting that the territory to the south of the Niassa Company lands, which was also the scene of significant WWI conflict, was controlled the Zambezi Company (founded 1892), under a similar arrangement. While employing better governance than the Niassa Company, the Allied powers? grip on the region was still tenuous. Portuguese forces in Mozambique technically numbered around 40,000, having being reinforced in September 1917 with 6,000 fresh troops from Europe, altogether under the command of Colonel Tom? de Sousa Rosa. The British had at least 50,000 men to support their efforts in Mozambique, although their long supply lines prevented most of this number from ever entering the country. NORFORCE was seen as the most promising and effective of the British forces, with 4,000 proven frontier fighters, well supplied from their forward base in Nyasaland. Returning to the military action, in late November 1917, as Lettow-Vorbeck prepared to invade Mozambique, he made the decision to ?go lean?, travelling with only 2,000 of his best troops (including 300 Germans, 1,700 Askaris, supported by 3,000 native porters). He knew that he would have to be quick and nimble to survive. He hoped that his companion force, under Theodor Tafel, would also be able to make it into Mozambique, such that they could join forces. Lettow-Vorbeck needed a big score that would give him a large re-supply of ammunition, food and medical supplies ? and he needed it immediately. He would thus enter Mozambique with a bang. The Portuguese army maintained a large fortress at Ngomano, guarding the German border where the Romuva is met by the Lujenda River. Ngomano had a garrison of 900, commanded by the Africa veteran Major Jo? Teixeira Pinto. More importantly, the fortress was stocked with an unusually large arsenal, as well as massive stores of food and medicine. Pinto, while warned by the British of a possible attack, foolishly prepared only for a frontal assault from the Romuva side. On November 25, 1917, Lettow-Vorbeck used up his remaining artillery to mount diversionary display from across the Romuva, while his force stealthily crossed the river upstream, attacking Ngomano from the rear. The Portuguese were caught totally off-guard, and Pinto and most of his top staff were killed, while the fortress was captured with no damage to its stores. Lettow-Vorbeck captured sufficient arms, food, clothing and medicine to last him for the rest of the war! In Lettow-Vorbeck?s own words, following Ngomano, ?several hundred [Portuguese] Askaris were taken prisoner. Valuable medical stores (...) and as a result of the Portuguese experience of centuries of colonial campaigning, of excellent quality, were captured, as well as several thousand kilos of European supplies, large numbers of rifles, six machine-guns and about thirty horses (...) A quarter of a million rounds of ammunition were captured, and this number was increased in the course of December [1917] to nearly one million?. Ngomano overshadowed the fact that on November 27, 1917, General Jacob van Deventer, the supreme British commander in East Africa, defeated and secured the surrender of Tafel?s force, thus ensuring that Lettow-Vorbeck?s 2,000-man force would have to fight on alone. The onset of the rainy season in the region, which ran from December 1917 to March 1918, ensured that major conflict ceased, while Lettow-Vorbeck chose a base in the Namuno Region, located between Montepuez and the Lurio River (in modern Cabo Delgado Province). Meanwhile, the British sought to regroup following the disasters of Mahiwa and Ngomano. NORFORCE was to be the spearhead of the British reprise to Lettow-Vorbeck?s invasion. In February 1918, Northey was summoned by Van Deventer to a conference in Beira, Mozambique. The two opinionated generals quarreled over operational issues, with Northey advocating a more aggressive offensive posture, while Van Deventer was initially content to cordon the Germans within a defined area, so waiting for them to reveal their hand. This dissonance was never fully resolved, and this certainty weakened the subsequent British operations in the region. Moreover, Van Deventer had acrimonious relations with the Portuguese, limiting what should have been close coordination between their respective forces. At the end of the Beria conference, Van Deventer and Northey agreed to pursue three basic goals, although they apparently never saw eye-to-eye on the means. The objectives were to: 1. Attack the Germans whenever possible, causing as much damage as possible (while notably doing little to protect the Portuguese, who they hoped the Germans would attack, thus wearing themselves down); 2. Prevent Lettow-Vorbeck from invading Nyasaland (Malawi); and 3. Prevent the Germans from reentering their own territory (Tanganyika). As soon as the rains receded in March 1918, the British began deployed massive reinforcements into Northern Mozambique, much of it entering the interior by way of Porto Am?ia (Pemba). The British set up a forward base at Miute (modern Napula Province), on the Lurio River. The British then mounted a multi-pronged offensive into the Namuno Region in effort to corral and defeat Lettow-Vorbeck. These efforts intensified through April, yet the wily German commander managed to avoid being pinned down, leading the British on a wild goose chase though malaria and yellow fever infested jungles. By mid-May, Lettow-Vorbeck had safely moved his base of operationa westwards to Nanungu. Northey was by this point frustrated, as while his subordinates had pressed the Schutztruppe hard from the west, this seemingly yielded no results. The British supply lines were also dangerously long, with NORFIRCE alone compelled to run a total of 2,660 km of different transport corridors. Sickness and fatigue befell many of the British troops. Meanwhile, the Portuguese were sitting on the sidelines, hoping that the British would do their job for them. In early June 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck moved further to the southwest, easily taking the Portuguese outpost of Malema. It was at this juncture that Northey called on Van Deventer to allow the British forces? various column commanders more liberty to act in the field, so that they could move as quickly and as nimbly as the Schutztruppe. He wrote: ?It appears to me that the Campaign seems now to have reached a stage when elaborate plans for cooperation worked out on a map are useless and only cause delay ... Each to act on initiative of its own commander who should have orders to take up offensive vigorously against any enemy within reach, without waiting for each other or their superior?s orders. The main thing is to regain the initiative and give the enemy no respite.? Next, the Germans mounted a daring attack far to the south of the established theatre, attacking an Anglo-Portuguese post at the railway station in Namacurra, just to the north of Quelimane. The defenders were caught totally unawares and the Schutztuppe scored a complete victory, unsettling the Anglo-Portuguese forces, and sending the message that the Allies ?were not safe anywhere?. Oddly, the presumed hunters now felt like the prey. Further north, Lettow-Vorbeck checked a much larger British force from his new base at Alto Mol?u?(modern Zambezia Province). An angry and frustrated Van Deventer blamed this setback on NORFORCE?s ?lack of initiative and determination?, although modern historians tend to believe that this was unfair. In reality, it was Van Deventer?s overall strategy that was at fault. Another British force was defeated at Namirru?(Zambezia), throwing the entire British effort into chaos. In August 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck realized that he had exhausted his resources and options in Mozambique, so decided to move the theatre westwards, into British territory. Denouement In August 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck invaded Northern Rhodesia. There he scored great success with his guerrilla tactics, inflicting havoc acoross a British territory that was ill-prepared for such an onslaught. However, on November 14, 1918, the German commander was handed a telegram informing him of the Armistice that ended World War I (on Western Allied terms). While Lettow-Vorbeck was undefeated, and had actually bettered his opponents, he was compelled to surrender to the British at Abercorn, Northern Rhodesia, on November 25, 1918. Due to his astounding feats, even Lettow-Vorbeck?s opponents referred to him as the ?Lion of Africa?, and in spite of history?s amnesia, he remains one of the greatest frontier fighters of all time. Britain, while technically victorious, and gaining Tanganyika (Mainland Tanzania) as a war prize, found the East Africa Campaign a bitter pill. Whitehall was deeply embarrassed by the number of men and resources it had expended, and the Exchequer was horrified that the campaign had cost the equivalent of over ?13 Billion in today?s money. As for NORFORCE?s efforts, the unit came under much contemporary criticism, as it was ultimately unable to stop Lettow-Vorbeck in Mozambique, while permitting him to invade Northern Rhodesia. That being said, it performed much better than the other British units, and under very trying circumstances remained functional for the entire war. Without NORFORCE?s efforts, the Schutztruppe would have caused far greater damage. At the very least, General Northey?s personal command was held in high esteem, and he was rewarded by the Crown for his efforts with a promotion, a knighthood and the appointment as the Governor of Kenya (serving 1919-22). Recently, historians have favourably reassessed NORFORCE and General Northey?s role in the East Africa Campaign. Ross Anderson, in his fine article, opines: ?Exerting strong leadership and overseeing detailed logistical planning, Northey was able to maintain an effective force that was consistently able to march and fight the German Schutztruppe under von Lettow-Vorbeck. In contrast to the main body of the British East African Force, Norforce maintained its combat effectiveness despite high levels of sickness and highly trying climatic conditions. Overall, Northey must be considered the outstanding British general of the East African Campaign while Norforce deserves full credit for its singular achievements.? References: British Library: Cartographic Items Maps X.1911.; National Archives U.K.: WO 300/267. Cf. [On Background:] Ross Anderson, ?Norforce: Major General Edward Northey and the Nyasaland and North- Eastern Rhodesia Frontier Force, January 1916 to June 1918?, Scientia Militaria, vol. 44, no. 1 (2016), pp. 47-80, esp. pp. 68-72; Nuno Lemos Pires, ?Mozambique and the choices made by Heinrich Schnee and Von Lettow-Vorbeck during the Great War?, in The Portuguese Campaigns in Africa: from the imposition of sovereignty to the Great War [Seminar Papers] (Military university Institute (Portugal), IUM ? Center for Research and Development (CIDIUM), June 2016), pp. 183 ? 210.
Last updated: Jun 6, 2018